This is Part IV of Strait Outta Taiwan’s ongoing series analyzing the Han Kuang 42 Exercise (漢光42號演習, HK42). HK42 started just over a week ago and rapidly progressed through its first two phases, “Preparedness Deployment (備戰部署)” and “Force Protection and Preservation (戰力防護及保存).” By August 8, the focus of this installment, the “Joint Counter-Landing (聯合反登陸)” phase, had begun. Part III of this series examined Preparedness Deployment, but the exercise’s unscripted nature and rapid progression blurred the lines between all four phases.

The Ministry of National Defense (國防部, MND) defines HK42’s Joint Counter-Landing phase as:

Simulating a scenario in which the People’s Liberation Army [人民解放軍, PLA] conducts joint fire strikes and its amphibious landing force conducts a maritime transit, followed by multidomain, multi-point amphibious landing operations. The Republic of China [中華民國, ROC] Armed Forces conduct key operations including securing localized air superiority, air defense of key areas, air-sea coordination, littoral strikes, nearshore defense, and the destruction of enemy forces by fire in key areas, in order to assess joint operational command and control and cross-domain fires coordination capabilities.

Read Strait Outta Taiwan’s HK42 analysis here:

Han Kuang Coverage

Two parts of the Joint Counter-Landing phase have stood out. First, expanding the engagement zone against approaching PLA landing forces before they get close to Taiwan’s shoreline. Second, testing how Taiwan’s forces can respond to PLA units that penetrate Taiwan’s initial defensive layers.

I. Expanding the Counter-Landing Engagement Zone

Littoral Strike and Nearshore Defense drill livestream.

On the morning of August 8, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德總統) observed a “Littoral Strike and Nearshore Defense (濱海打擊及近岸防禦)” drill in Kaohsiung. The exercise, livestreamed by the ROC Navy (海軍), demonstrated operations extending from emergency sortie and littoral strike to nearshore defense. Taken together, the drill showed Taiwan trying to extend its counter-landing engagement zone outward while linking drones, maritime forces, and nearshore defenders into a broader defensive sequence.

I discussed this in comments to Business Insider, flagging that Taiwan needs to create more engagement opportunities before the PLA gets close to the shore:

A range of 40 kilometers to 60 kilometers would be very useful for a whole host of different platforms, anything to make it more difficult for the PLA to start getting into Taiwan’s territorial waters.

That range also broadly aligns with the outer operational layer identified in CNAS’s “Hellscape for Taiwan” report, which places some coastal engagement zones roughly 40–80 kilometers from shore.

Throughout the drill, reflecting what was envisioned for Littoral Combat Command (海濱作戰指揮部), unmanned systems and other emerging technologies were fully integrated. As noted in Part I of this HK42 series, Legislator Chen Kuan-Ting (陳冠廷立委) described the Command’s use of unmanned systems as providing “eyes, brains, and fists (眼睛、大腦與拳頭).” This drill put the legislator’s description of the Command’s kill chain on full display and into action. Furthermore, the drill highlighted another HK42 theme — deepening integration between the ROC Navy and Coast Guard (海巡).

II. Containing Enemy Breakthroughs

Live-fire Joint Counter-Landing drill on Penghu Island.

In the Joint Counter-Landing phase of HK42 and beyond, ways to plug PLA breakthroughs in littoral environments have been a consistent theme. Penghu County, a Taiwan-controlled archipelago in the middle of the Strait, has little geographic or strategic depth but is vital to defending Taiwan’s main island. Penghu has been integral to Taiwan’s security. It was used by Koxinga in the 17th century as a staging ground to invade Taiwan and was seized by the Imperial Japanese Forces as part of their campaign to take Taiwan in the late 19th century.

I spoke with Domino Theory about the importance of Penghu, where I highlighted:

The Penghu drill matched the expected mission of dispersed, survivable, road-mobile anti-ship fires that can defend threatened littoral sectors.

To prepare Penghu, MND’s First Operational Zone Command rehearsed counter-landing drills, coastal strikes, anti-airborne/air assault drills, and protected critical infrastructure by placing barriers and other engineering structures along the coastline. These drills seek to prevent PLA forces from establishing or consolidating a foothold. Similar drills have occurred across Taiwan, particularly in Yilan County in the northeast and New Taipei City, which encircles Taipei City.

Establishing a defensive line on the Tamsui River.

Within New Taipei City, especially along the Tamsui River, a breach could provide PLA forces with an avenue to rapidly reach Taiwan’s political center, Taipei’s Zhongzheng District. As a result, defending the mouth of the Tamsui River and areas along its banks has been a priority for HK42.

HK42’s Joint Counter-Landing phase shows that Taiwan seeks to engage PLA forces before they reach the shoreline. Simultaneously, Taiwan is preparing to contain forces that penetrate its initial defenses and prevent them from consolidating a foothold. The exercise’s final phase, “In-Depth Defense and Sustained Operations (縱深防禦及持久作戰),” presents the challenge of fighting PLA forces that have made it through these initial defensive layers.

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This is Part III of Strait Outta Taiwan’s ongoing series analyzing the Han Kuang 42 Exercise (漢光42號演習, HK42). The exercise started on Wednesday, August 5, 2026, and will conclude on Friday, August 14. This installment highlights efforts to execute the first phase of HK42, “Preparedness Deployment (備戰部署),” from August 5–7 through dispersal and decentralization, as well as the obstruction and securing of key locations.

According to the Ministry of National Defense (國防部, MND), HK42’s Preparedness Deployment phase focuses on:

Under the guise of its annual joint military exercises, the People’s Liberation Army [人民解放軍, PLA] conducts large-scale amphibious assault training to conceal its intent to attack Taiwan while completing final preparations for an invasion. The three services immediately raise their combat-readiness posture and, in conjunction with Immediate Readiness Exercises [立即戰備操演], carry out peacetime-to-wartime transition measures including mobilization preparations, pre-positioning of obstacles, dispersed stockpiling of materiel, cross-regional maneuver, and preparations for defensive mine-laying.

Read Strait Outta Taiwan’s HK42 analysis here:

Han Kuang Coverage

The ability to prevent decapitation — of national leadership and across Taiwan’s command-and-control (C2) structure — could, as Ukraine has demonstrated, sow the seeds of a rally-around-the-flag effect in the days, weeks, and potentially months after Zero Day.

I. Dispersal & Decentralization

Wednesday morning, August 5, air and naval assets were dispersed in an emergency fashion to test how quickly these platforms could be protected in the event of an invasion or contingency. Mirage 2000s, F-16Vs, C-130s, E-2Ks, and P-3Cs were flown from bases on Taiwan’s west coast in Hsinchu, Chiayi, and Pingtung to Chihhang and Chiashan air bases in Taitung and Hualien. Similarly, Coast Guard and Navy vessels departed the Port of Keelung near Taipei.

Replenishment operation with civilian vehicles.

The next day, logistics were similarly distributed across military bases and civilian points of interest using military and civilian assets. For example, in Hualien, civilian trucks were requisitioned by the military for a replenishment operation to transport ammunition and rations under the guise that they would be less likely to be attacked by PLA forces. In keeping with the theme of greater civil-military cooperation, civilian tractor-trailers supplied frontline M109 howitzers with concealed 155 mm ammunition.

To ensure that Taiwan’s national leadership could withstand attempts against it through decapitation attacks, President Lai participated in the Wanjun Plan (萬鈞計劃), where the 202nd Military Police transported him at night from the Presidential Office (總統府) to the Heng Shan Military Command Center (衡山指揮所) in the north of Taipei. The exercise also demonstrated decentralization beyond C2, particularly through the integration of civilian assets into military logistics. For example, civilian fuel trucks replenished military fuel trucks to sustain troops in northern Taipei that were defending the red beaches.

II. Obstructing & Securing Key Locations

Next, the Preparedness Deployment phase focused on obstructing and securing key locations of strategic importance around Taiwan’s main island and outer islands. For example, the Port of Taipei (台北港) was obstructed by mobilizing civilian cargo and fishing vessels to block its entrance as well as loading mines aboard Navy and Coast Guard vessels the following day. Together, these measures created a layered harbor-denial defense at the Port of Taipei.

Livestream of the obstruction operation on Taipei’s Danjiang Bridge (淡江大橋).

Civilian volunteers from MND’s All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency (全民動員署, ADMA) and military personnel worked together to place obstacles on red beach access roads in Yilan County. Similarly, ADMA volunteers and military personnel also placed barriers and obstacles on the Danjiang Bridge, at the mouth of the Tamsui River north of Taipei — a highlight of HK42 prominently promoted by MND.

Key locations were secured around Taiwan. For example, military and civilian authorities worked together to place reversible and irreversible obstacles around Taoyuan International Airport to defend it against potential PLA airborne incursions.

Troops were deployed to Green and Orchid Islands.

Likewise, outer islands, specifically Taitung County’s Green and Orchid Islands, as well as Xiaoliuqiu in Pingtung County, were secured. Their proximity to Chihhang and Chiashan air bases and Kaohsiung City, respectively, means that securing them early helps ensure the PLA cannot use them as forward bases for helicopters, drones, or missiles. If seized, they would threaten those air bases and Kaohsiung City. Military personnel were deployed to the islands using civilian ferries, and a similar operation was carried out on Green and Orchid Islands in last month’s Joint Defense Exercise (聯合防禦操演).

The first phase of HK42’s live-fire exercise, the Preparedness Deployment, is about rapidly complicating the PLA’s ability to paralyze Taiwan in the opening of any contingency. To respond, MND has focused on several areas, but dispersal and decentralization, as well as obstructing and securing key locations, highlight efforts to stymie PLA operations. As HK42 progresses, the Preparedness Deployment phase has laid the foundation for assessing how effectively Taiwan can execute the phases that follow.

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This is Part II of Strait Outta Taiwan’s ongoing series examining Han Kuang 42 Exercise (漢光42號演習, HK42), taking place from August 5-14. Part I explored the preparatory activities that began before the exercise’s official start date. This installment examines reserve mobilization and whole-of-society defense resilience, two efforts that underpin the exercise’s live-fire phase.

Read Strait Outta Taiwan’s HK42 analysis here:

Han Kuang Coverage

The key point is that HK42 did not begin when the live-fire phase opened. It began when Taiwan started testing whether people, equipment, local governments, civilian infrastructure, and reserve units could be moved from peacetime routines into a usable wartime posture.

I observed part of HK42’s live-fire range training in northern Taiwan and spoke with TaiwanPlus from the beach as the drills unfolded behind us. The interview focused on what the mobilization and live-fire activity revealed about Taiwan’s broader readiness cycle.

I. Han Kuang Started before August 5

HK42 is scheduled to begin its live-fire phase on August 5, but the exercise has already been underway since late July. The early signals of HK42’s quiet ramping up were not dramatic missile launches or armored columns, but recall orders, report windows, equipment issues, unit formation, mobilization support desks, and reservists moving toward assembly points island-wide. The warm-up to HK42 is not only a test of how Taiwan’s active-duty force fights, but how quickly Taiwan can generate usable wartime forces from its reserve system.

As the live-fire exercise occurs for HK42, it is supported and complemented by two other exercises — Tung-Hsin 36 Exercise (同心36號演習, TH36) and 2026 Urban Resilience Air Defense Exercise (2026城鎮韌性（防空）演習). Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience (全社會防衛韌性) is a focus of President Lai Ching-te (賴清德總統); his Administration established its committee and elevated the Ministry of National Defense’s (國防部, MND) All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency (全民動員署, ADMA).

One of HK42’s several training items is Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience to ensure civil-military coordination through Local Joint Emergency Operations Centers (聯合應變指揮管制中心, LJEOC) between the MND, ADMA, and county and city governments. Both TH36 and the Urban Resilience Exercise will fit into the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience portion of HK42’s live-fire exercise.

II. Reserve Mobilization & Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience

As HK42 approached, Taiwanese netizens shared their mobilization experiences on social media. According to reports, HK42 will mobilize two brigade-level reserve units — one in northern and one in southern Taiwan — of up to 5,000 reservists. Many posted public notices that their businesses will be closed between August 1-14 due to mobilization. Attached to HK42 is TH36, which supports Taiwan’s ability to mobilize reservists island-wide. Through TH36, MND planners can test whether reservists:

• Receive and comply with recall orders.

• Report to assigned units and assembly points.

• Complete mobilization and unit formation requirements.

• Transition from a peacetime reserve status to deployment readiness or wartime operational roles.

What stands out about the recalls for TH36 is several of the broader trends that it reveals about how Taiwan is preparing for combat readiness:

• Nationwide geographic distribution: Recall notices appeared across Taiwan’s main island and outer islands, suggesting a model of local forces defending local areas rather than concentrating mobilization in one place.

• Assembly points around civilian infrastructure: Most of the assembly points for reservist mobilization were not MND facilities or bases, but key civilian gathering points amongst their local communities like universities, grade schools, temples, community centers, veterans homes, cultural parks, power plants, and transportation hubs.

• Planning timeline: Many notices were sent out weeks or months in advance, indicating that recalls were a part of a planned mobilization cycle and not ad hoc, feeding into the planning that dominates HK42’s continuous training cycle.

• Modernized individual equipment: Reporting notes that some reservists are receiving or training with newer equipment like M4A1 carbines, helmets, tactical vests, ballistic plates, uniforms, and drones. That matters because it ensures they can be re-equipped, sorted by specialty, and be operationally useful once mobilized.

According to reporting and what has been shared by Taiwanese netizens, much of the reserve mobilization is tied to “speciality identification (專長鑑定).” Reserve forces are only useful if the MND can match personnel to wartime tasks within functioning units. Given the breadth and depth of the various units that have been recalled, across all five of Taiwan’s service branches — infantry, engineering, communications, logistics, etc. — the ability to assign these mobilized reservists to specific functions shows that MND is trying to regenerate multiple wartime capabilities.

It remains to be seen how recalled units perform, something that HK42 will shed light on over the first half of August. Still, the process of issuing notices, reporting windows, assembly points, equipment issue, and planned specialized training is important unto itself. Assigning mobilized reservists quickly in the early stages of a Taiwan contingency could be the difference between life and death when a crisis arrives.

Throughout the Immediate Readiness and Joint Defense Exercises earlier this summer, urban resilience was already visible through testing civilian medical networks and hospitals. Although much about the Urban Resilience Exercise has not been as visible yet, the use of civilian infrastructure for TH36, the roles that LJEOCs will play, and the occurrences for the Urban Resilience Exercise on August 7 and 10-13 around Taiwan and its outer islands show how HK42’s live-fire exercise, TH36’s reserve mobilization, and the Urban Resilience exercise all fit together.

HK42’s live-fire phase may draw the headlines, but it rests on weeks of quieter preparation. Reserve mobilization, equipment issue, civilian infrastructure, and whole-of-society coordination are not separate activities — they are the foundation that allows Taiwan’s military to generate combat power before the first shot is fired. This matters because Taiwan’s defense problem is not only whether active-duty units can fight, but whether the state can regenerate combat power, sustain civil order, and keep local systems functioning under pressure.

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For many observers, the Han Kuang exercise begins when armored vehicles and troops roll into the streets of Taipei. In reality, the exercise, specifically this year’s iteration, Han Kuang 42 Exercise (漢光42號演習, HK42), is the culmination of a broader cycle of command-post planning, immediate readiness and mobilization exercises, and joint training that has unfolded over months.

To understand Han Kuang, it’s necessary to grasp how Taiwan’s military exercise system has evolved. Its annual combat patch, the capabilities highlighted, and the exercise itself reveal an armed force that is iterating, evaluating, and adapting its doctrine, training, and capabilities for an asymmetric defense strategy — and civilian leadership seeking deeper integration to strengthen Taiwan’s whole-of-society response.

I. Understanding the Han Kuang Exercise

Military News Agency’s HK42 Trailer.

On Tuesday, July 28, 2026, within the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of National Defense (MND) Taipei Headquarters, a press conference previewed the live-fire portion of the HK42. Scheduled for August 5—14, 2026, HK42 is Taiwan’s largest annual military exercise, and this year’s live-fire portion is expected to be the most expansive yet. The MND framed the exercise as a keystone within its “year-round, interconnected exercise-and-training cycle (全年度連貫演訓方式).”

Han Kuang is no longer a single ten-day military exercise, but the culminating live-fire event in a series of year-round trainings and exercises beginning with computer-assisted planning and slowly building towards civil preparedness activities and a large live-fire exercise. HK42 will offer a window into how Taiwan is developing its own “Hellscape Strategy” and preparing for asymmetric defense, while prominently centering civil-military resilience.

Archival footage from the 1958 Combined U.S.-ROC Military Exercise (中美軍事大演習), depicting the first combined amphibious landing by U.S. and ROC Marines at Fangliao, southern Taiwan. The exercise foreshadowed concepts that underpin the Han Kuang exercises. Video by the National Film and Audiovisual Center.

Han Kuang’s origins can be found in the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROC before the termination of diplomatic relations in 1979. The Combined U.S.-Chinese Military Exercises (中美聯合軍事演習), which included personnel from the then-U.S. Taiwan Defense Command and ROC MND units, were Taiwan’s first major annual military exercises. Following the diplomatic rupture, the exercises were eventually named Han Kuang, a reference to the ROC slogans, “China, Liberate the Mainland (大漢、光復大陸)” and “Liberate China (大漢光復).” HK1 took place in 1984, and subsequent successor exercises have a number as well.

II. How Han Kuang 42 Works

Starting this year, Han Kuang’s live-fire exercise functions as the culmination of a four-part training and exercise cycle. According to the MND, this four-part continuous training and exercise cycle is intended to incorporate “revisions of the Joint Operations Plan, force structure adjustments, and subsequent military buildup and readiness planning” while strengthening Taiwan’s “multi-domain denial and resilient defense” capabilities.

These four phases structure HK42’s live-fire exercise. In contrast, HK41 featured five phases and began with the Gray-Zone Response (灰色地帶襲擾應處) phase, and treated Littoral and Beachhead Operations (濱海暨灘岸戰鬥) as distinct from the Joint Counter-Landing phase. The Immediate Readiness Exercise (立即戰備操演), which fell under HK41’s Gray-Zone Response phase, is now a standalone exercise as of HK42. Given the increase by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and air forces, the Chinese Coast Guard, and Blue Water Militia across the First Island Chain, Taipei appears to be preparing for the possibility that a contingency emerges with little or no warning.

Han Kuang and similar exercises are often affected by typhoons. For example, this year’s Joint Defense Exercise, the MND positioned troops to move directly from the exercise’s training to assisting with cleanup, humanitarian assistance, and disaster-response missions related to Typhoon Bavi. Building upon a broader civil-military integration push, operational commanders were instructed to stay in contact with county and city governments and provide support as needed.

III. Reading the Han Kuang 42 Combat Patch

HK42’s combat patch retains the recurring “Guardian of Democracy” framing while highlighting three weapon systems key to the island’s defense — the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the ALTIUS-600M Attack UAV, and the Patriot PAC-3 air-defense system — set against a circuit board backdrop. Together, they communicate several messages:

• Reliance on U.S. Systems and Interoperability: All three capabilities are U.S.-made or supplied, signaling reliance on U.S. systems and potential interoperability.

• Layered Asymmetric Defense: Collectively, they represent complementary aspects of Taiwan’s layered asymmetric defense capabilities, i.e., long-range precision fires (HIMARS), loitering attack drones (ALTIUS-600M), and air and missile defense (Patriot PAC-3).

• Integration into the Broader First Island Chain Defense Ecosystem: Points to the broader regional defense ecosystem with the U.S. and allies integrating similar capabilities in exercises, drills, and demonstrations.

• Technology, the Force Multiplier: The circuit board background points to the tech-led changing elements of modern warfare and Taiwan’s growing asymmetric capabilities powered by emerging technologies.

M142 HIMARS

HIMARS’s inclusion on the HK42 combat patch underscores the MND’s emphasis on long-range precision fires. HIMARS helped enable the Ukrainian Armed Forces to engage in precision strikes deeper into Russian rear territory by targeting logistic nodes, supply networks, rear troops, and other enablers of Russian troops. Taiwan has also begun integrating HIMARS into its own defensive posture with maneuver drills and live-fire demonstrations focused on the Taiwan Strait. HIMARS was deployed prominently in both the Immediate Readiness Exercise for force preservation and engagement drills and the Joint Defense Exercise, with rapid cross-operational-area fire support.

Of the three platforms depicted on HK42’s combat patch, HIMARS is the only one that has appeared before, with HK41’s patch also prominently featuring the HIMARS. The platform also appeared in PLA messaging surrounding the December 2025 Justice Mission Exercise. A propaganda poster released by the PLA Eastern Command showed the HIMARS being carried by container ships turning back, a point the Global Times stressed in its commentary. Taken together, these references suggest HIMARS is essential to Taiwan’s defense and a major irritant to the PLA.

Patriot PAC-3

The Patriot PAC-3 remains Taiwan’s principal strategic air and missile defense capability, forming the upper tier of its layered network alongside indigenous systems. The MND has repeatedly showcased Patriot batteries over the past year — during HK41, PAC-2 and PAC-3 units were deployed across Taipei for air-defense drills. Similarly, for Justice Mission 2025, PAC-3 batteries operated around Taiwan to monitor PLA live-fire activity and rehearse combat-readiness procedures. Its inclusion on the HK42 patch underscores the centrality of air and missile defense to Taiwan’s deterrence posture, especially as the MND continues developing its T-Dome integrated air-defense concept.

ALTIUS-600M

ROC MND ALTIUS-600M Attack UAVs conducting their first sea target shooting. Video by Military News Agency.

Lastly, the ALTIUS-600M Attack UAV was included on the HK42 patch because it illustrates how Taiwan is integrating unmanned platforms into kill chains to defend its littoral. The ALTIUS-600M not only serves as a strike asset but also sits at the intersection of distributed sensing, target identification, and lower-cost precision attack. That role is especially relevant after Taiwan’s recent establishment of the Littoral Combat Command (濱海作戰指揮部), with the ALTIUS-600M providing a key standoff capability.

IV. What I Will Be Watching

The most revealing aspects of HK42 will not necessarily be the newest platforms on display, but how Taiwan employs them. The exercise offers an opportunity to assess whether recent time and money investments in the ROC forces are learning to disperse, survive, communicate, and generate combat power under sustained attack. With that in mind, these are capabilities and concepts I will watch closely.

HIMARS Deployments

U.S. Air Force, Balikatan 2026: 317th AW, 25th ID perform HIRAIN in Itbayat, Philippines. Video by Senior Airman Jade M. Caldwell, April 23, 2026. DVIDS. Video ID: 1004203.

In exercises throughout the Indo-Pacific, HIMARS Rapid Infiltration (HIRAIN), a concept that uses C-130 aircraft to rapidly deploy a HIMARS launcher, conduct a firing mission, and quickly redeploy before the platform can be targeted, has played a central role. The video above shows a HIRAIN mission close to Taiwan on the northern Philippine island of Itbayat, illustrating HIMARS’ importance to the defense of the First Island Chain, including the approaches to Taiwan.

Though Taiwan lacks strategic depth, making a HIRAIN mission impractical, for HK42, HIMARS will likely be dispersed during the Force Protection and Preservation phase and participate in live-fire missions in the Joint Counter-Landing phase to maximize survivability, mobility, and lethality.

The Role of Littoral Combat Command

The Littoral Combat Command seems to be operationalizing the concepts highlighted in the Center for a New American Security report, “Hellscape for Taiwan.” As HK42 unfolds, the ALTIUS-600M could become one of this Command’s principal platforms as its counter-landing and standoff doctrines are refined.

After a visit to the Command’s First Group, Legislator Chen Kuan-Ting (陳冠廷立委) described its use of unmanned systems as providing “eyes, brains, and fists (眼睛、大腦與拳頭).” Throughout HK42, ALTIUS-600M and other unmanned systems will likely be deployed during the Joint Counter-Landing phase, fulfilling the role Legislator Chen laid out. I will be watching to see how those systems, in coordination with missile platforms, are utilized in the Command’s kill chain.

Counter-UAS Integration

Over the last several years, conflicts from the Middle East to Ukraine have shown how vulnerable bases, critical infrastructure, large platforms, and personnel are to unmanned attacks. Taiwan has taken steps to implement counter-UAS measures, ranging from testing “soft kill (軟殺)” and “hard kill (硬殺)” platforms in the Joint Defense Exercise to purchasing netting to protect military bases.

However, in recent exercises, armored vehicles and field positions are often shown without cages or netting. Furthermore, the recent tragic deaths of U.S. Air Defense Artillery personnel, as well as Ukrainian targeting of Russian S-400 air-defense systems, show that even high-end defensive platforms and personnel are vulnerable to unmanned systems. I will be observing how Taiwan can integrate all forms of counter-UAS measures throughout HK42.

V. Looking Ahead

With HK42 starting on August 5, 2026, I will closely follow the exercise as it unfolds. Expect Strait Outta Taiwan to publish a series of short- and long-form analyses examining not only what happens, but what it reveals about Taiwan’s evolving approach to deterrence, defense innovation, and whole-of-society resilience.

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As Canada seeks to renew and strengthen its defence industrial base and deepen Indo-Pacific engagement, the new Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) will depend on strong partnerships with leading technology ecosystems.

To accomplish its mandate, the DSRB should include Taiwan. Without Taiwan’s participation, it will struggle to achieve its objectives, given the island’s centrality to “non-red” dual-use technologies and its growing appetite to finance that ecosystem.

What is the DSRB

On April 29, 2026, the government of Prime Minister Mark J. Carney announced that it had secured the DSRB’s headquarters in Canada. Although DSRB negotiations are still underway, once the charter is ratified, it aims to “mobilise the capital needed to help like-minded allies and partners finance their capabilities for the defence, security, and resilience of the democratic world.”

What makes the DSRB unique is that it is not simply another source of defence spending but a mechanism to strengthen the long-term industrial foundations of democratic security. Once established, the DSRB will be able to leverage the collective creditworthiness of participating countries to mobilise capital for defence and industrial projects that individual governments may struggle to finance on their own.

By unlocking affordable capital, the DSRB will empower member states to pursue projects that, without its backing, would impose significant fiscal burdens or be outright unaffordable. In turn, more predictable demand can give industry the confidence to invest in research and development and expand production capacity.

On July 7, 2026, the Prime Minister’s Office announced that eight countries — Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Türkiye, and Ukraine — had committed to supporting the Canada-led DSRB and efforts to make it operational by 2027. The announcement also made clear that the DSRB will focus on small and medium-sized enterprises, including by helping them address “critical financing gaps.” That makes the question of participation urgent.

As the DSRB moves from concept to institution, Canada should define flexible pathways for partners that may not fit neatly into traditional diplomatic categories.

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Engagement is Already Expanding

Canada’s interest in the DSRB also aligns with Ottawa’s growing Indo-Pacific engagement, including exercises, defence agreements, advanced sensing, and dual-use technology cooperation. This includes Canada’s role in leading the air component command at RIMPAC this year, its new status of visiting forces agreement with the Philippines, and growing defence ties with Australia and New Zealand.

Canada’s acquisition of Australian over-the-horizon radar technology for use in the Arctic also shows how Indo-Pacific partners can contribute directly to Canada’s own defence modernization. At the same time, Canadian and New Zealand defence science communities, including Defence Research and Development Canada and the New Zealand Defence Force’s Science and Technology Group, are exploring challenge-based defence innovation and dual-use technology solutions.

In this context, Taiwan’s inclusion in the DSRB would not be a departure from the existing Canadian Indo-Pacific Strategy, but a logical extension of it. As Canada’s security, technology, and industrial links across the Indo-Pacific grow, the DSRB can reflect this reality by providing Taiwan with a flexible way to participate in financing trusted defence, dual-use, and industrial capacity.

Put differently, Canada may not have a declared first-island-chain strategy, but it is beginning to build the habits of one.

Why Taiwan Matters to the DSRB

Taiwan has much to offer the DSRB as a trusted partner, owing to its advanced semiconductor industry and dual-use innovation ecosystem. Many DSRB-funded projects will likely depend on Taiwanese firms, given the centrality of the island’s electronics and semiconductor industries within trusted supply chains.

The Carney government has already framed progress on the DSRB alongside the Defence Industrial Strategy and recent defence investments as underscoring rearmament efforts and reinforcing “Canada’s role as a trusted partner in collective defence and security.” Taiwan’s push for a non-red supply chain complements Canada’s recent defence-industrial renewal agenda.

The Canadian government recognised Taiwan’s importance in dual-use technologies by establishing the Taipei hard tech Canadian Technology Accelerator program earlier this year. This program focuses on dual-use technologies that are key to Canada’s defence-industrial sovereignty, including drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), autonomous mobile robots, and advanced communications, such as 6G.

If Canada is already investing diplomatic, military, and technological efforts in the region’s defence ecosystem, excluding Taiwan from the DSRB would leave out one of the most important nodes for advanced manufacturing and dual-use technology in the Indo-Pacific.

SMEs Foster Agile Innovation

Ukraine’s economy, dominated by SMEs, shows how small or medium powers can attract private investment while remaining agile enough to iterate commercially – qualities that closely align with the DSRB’s purpose. Given this, Taiwan’s SME-dominated economy complements the DSRB’s efforts to address the three challenges of affordable capital, smaller and faster procurement, and unlocking private capital.

The decentralised nature of SME-dominated innovation economies like Taiwan’s can enable rapid iteration, attract private investment, and scale up commercially available technologies more quickly. Taiwan’s position at the intersection of a dense network of Original Equipment Manufacturers and component suppliers, a highly skilled, tech-forward engineering labour force, and an SME-dominated economy fosters agility that can complement larger allied defence-industrial ecosystems such as Canada’s.

Decades of diplomatic isolation have pushed Taiwanese industry to pursue dual-use technologies outside traditional supply chains. Taiwan’s unique attributes would help the DSRB accomplish its stated mission, advance Canada’s defence-industrial goals, and strengthen the resilience of like-minded partners.

How Taiwan could Participate

When it comes to participation in the DSRB, Taiwan’s ambiguous diplomatic status should not force an all-or-nothing choice. Because the DSRB seeks to be a “multilateral bank owned exclusively by nation-states,” full membership is unattainable. Still, the final DSRB charter should not prohibit Taiwan’s participation as an associate member, observer, or adviser.

Without the involvement of Taiwan’s government, Taiwanese financial institutions or manufacturers could participate by providing capital, as Deutsche Bank has already expressed interest. Or, Taiwan could participate as a like-minded “economy,” as it does in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation with Canada. Taiwan is also an adviser to the U.S.-led Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience, whose goals overlap with the DSRB and in which Canada is a full member.

Conclusion

The question is not whether Taiwan can fit neatly into existing diplomatic categories, but whether Carney’s government can use the DSRB to truly finance the trusted democratic industrial capacity needed without engaging one of the world’s most important advanced-manufacturing and dual-use technology ecosystems.

To ensure it can, the Carney government should advocate that the DSRB include flexible participation mechanisms for places like Taiwan. Doing so would help the DSRB accomplish its goal, help Canada realise its strategic priorities, and help small and medium-sized democracies to advance their sovereignty and strengthen their economies collectively.

Back in early March, I joined TaiwanPlus’ Connected Sidelines video podcast, then hosted by Tomasz Koper, to discuss Taiwan’s defense-tech challenge, unmanned systems, and what it would actually mean to build a credible “hellscape” strategy in the Taiwan Strait.

The episode recently aired on TaiwanPlus, and now that it has been posted on YouTube, I wanted to share a quick breakdown of the main points I made.

Note: some references to the Special Defense Budget reflect the state of play at the time of recording. I wrote about the budget last month for World Politics Review, and the broader argument still holds up well.

Defense Innovation Beyond Drones

Drones in Taiwan are receiving a lot of attention, in part because of discussion around the “hellscape” strategy; however, it goes beyond that. It is about whether Taiwan can build a defense innovation ecosystem fast enough that links across national security, defense, economic, and other civilian agencies with science and technology institutions, private industry, startups, and international partners. Taiwan’s small and medium-sized enterprise-based economy gives it the right footing to do this, but government signals matter. When done effectively, unmanned systems, counter-UAS capabilities, and distributed production can make any coercive or invasion scenario against the island more costly and uncertain for any potential adversary.

Ukraine’s Lesson is Speed & Adaptation

Taiwan cannot copy Ukraine one-for-one, but it can learn from how quickly Ukraine tests, adapts, discards, and improves systems under wartime pressure. The Technology Readiness Level cycle is compressing quickly, especially in drones, counter-UAS, and other applications. Ukraine has shown how quickly defense technology cycles can move when systems are tested, adapted, discarded, and improved under pressure. Taiwan needs more of that experimental culture to be fostered across the public, private, and non-profit sectors. All the right ingredients are there; it’s up to policymakers to harness them and move forward.

Lessons from Smaller, Adaptive Partners

Source: Defence Research and Development Canada / @DRDC_RDDC, X (formerly Twitter), June 3, 2026. Original post: [link]. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – Canada. No endorsement implied.

The United States remains essential to Taiwan’s security, but Taiwan should also study countries that innovate under constraint in peace and wartime. Taiwan’s economy and defense-industrial base are distinct and better suited to learning from countries like Canada, as I wrote in the Global Taiwan Brief earlier this year. However, as an Information Technology & Innovation Foundation article this week highlighted concerns about funding in Canada’s innovation ecosystem, financial backing for research and development remains key to bolstering innovation, and the debate in Taiwan over the lack of funding for Taiwan’s drone industry continues today.

The video above shows Defense Research and Development Canada’s ARC conducting a maritime surveillance trial as part of the Canadian Autonomy Trial Series, under the Bureau of Research, Engineering and Advanced Leadership in Innovation and Science. The Canadian Autonomy Trial Series highlights how government and industry can work together to advance sovereign innovation toward an established operational capability, a lesson that Taiwan could operationalize.

To wrap it up, what I wanted to convey in this interview is not overly complicated: Taiwan’s defense innovation and the adoption of dual-use technology are not just acquisition problems, but should be envisioned around institutional speed, industrial policy, and public-private sector partnership.

The full Connected Sidelines interview is available on TaiwanPlus’ website and YouTube.

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While much of the commentary surrounding the summit between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, has focused on tariffs, Taiwan, and summit optics, one of the most revealing developments occurred last week, before the summit even began.

Last week, Senator Steve Daines (R-MO) led a bipartisan Congressional Delegation (CODEL) to China to explicitly focus on “Chinese Technology and Domestic Innovation,” including visits to technology firms in Shanghai and Beijing.

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The significance of the Daines CODEL went beyond the visit itself. It reflected that U.S.-China competition is increasingly being shaped by technology ecosystems, industrial capacity, semiconductors, AI, and dual-use innovation rather than trade balances or military signaling alone. Taiwan sits at the center of those ecosystems, particularly in semiconductors and dual-use supply chains, making it increasingly difficult to separate cross-Strait security issues from broader technological and industrial competition.

During the summit, I argued in commentary with Le Point, Newsweek, and Taiwan Talks that Beijing continues to frame the bilateral relationship in a deeply strategic, security-centric manner. At the same time, Washington approaches it through a more transactional, economically oriented lens, focusing on the most sensitive geopolitical flashpoints.

That asymmetry matters because over the three days of the summit, Beijing’s messaging on Taiwan, strategic competition, and broader geopolitical issues remained disciplined, fast, and highly coordinated. Washington’s messaging, by comparison, often appeared slower and more diffuse, reinforcing broader concerns in Taipei and across the Indo-Pacific about how both sides continue to frame long-term competition differently.

Beijing’s confidence was on full display as Chinese state media and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) emphasized Xi Jinping’s direct warning to Trump that the “Taiwan question” remains the most important issue in U.S.-China relations and could lead to “clashes and even conflicts” if mishandled. Furthermore, Xi appeared to outline an early vision for managing relations among great powers and for coexistence, even if Trump did not publicly reciprocate or engage with the substance of those remarks.

NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang’s presence at the summit, future keynote address at COMPUTEX 2026 in Taipei, and ongoing debates surrounding AI chip sales to China all reflect how difficult it has become to compartmentalize Taiwan from broader U.S.-China technological and industrial competition.

Regardless of whether Washington intended the summit to focus primarily on economics and trade, Beijing repeatedly elevated Taiwan as the focal point of the strategic conversation. At the same time, the Daines CODEL showed that innovation and technology ecosystems are driving long-term U.S.-China competition.

The risk for Taipei is likely not sudden abandonment, but a deeper “linkage” between Taiwan and broader U.S.-China negotiations. Over time, that could manifest through slower arms deliveries, weaker diplomatic signaling, and increasing pressure to fold Taiwan into broader U.S.-China bargaining dynamics.

The Daines CODEL signaled that “linkage” before the summit even began. Taiwan, for better or worse, may be the most acute manifestation of that ecosystem and its vulnerabilities. And as the summit ended, MFA spokesperson Mao Ning described Trump’s departure not only as a “farewell,” but “a new beginning” — perhaps one where those technological and strategic linkages become even harder to separate.

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